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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LINDA H. JENSEN, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
No. 20010721-CA 
vs. 
JAMES T. JENSEN, Argument Priority 15 
Respondent/Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, PRESIDING 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case is before this Court for the second time. When it was here previously 
Judge Young was directed to explain the basis for his unequal division of the marital es-
tate and justify his award of alimony. On remand, Judge Young simply reversed himself, 
concluding contrary to his earlier decision that there were no exceptional circumstances 
and that Wife had no need for alimony. There is no more explanation of this decision 
than the previous one, and it appears that Judge Young misunderstood this Court's in-
structions and failed to follow the proper legal analysis. 
The function of the trial court in a divorce action is to do equity, and the function 
of this Court should be to see that equity was indeed done. In this case, Husband does 
not attempt to show that the result is equitable. Instead, Husband resorts to invective, hy-
perbole, and misapplication of legal principles in order to divert attention from a result 
which the trial court itself characterized as inequitable. 
Husband's defense of the trial court's property division is unpersuasive because it 
fails to justify the unequal distribution in Husband's favor or to justify the lower court's 
failure to apply the instructions of the Utah Supreme Court concerning the appropriate 
considerations in division of property in divorce. Moreover, Husband's defense of the 
lower court's failure to rectify the misallocation of marital and separate assets requires 
this Court to endorse Husband's description of the transactions involving those properties 
as shams. This Court should reject Husband's arguments. The property division on re-
mand should be reversed because the lower court failed to apply the appropriate legal 
standard in considering exceptional circumstances, and failed to remedy the acknowl-
edged award of substantial marital property to husband as part of the separate estate. 
The lower court's use of historical average stock market returns to justify its 
award of no alimony was unsupported by any evidence. Wife objected many times to the 
use of that figure, but included it in her submissions on the alimony issue because it was 
the only figure the court would consider. The practice of reliance on historical average 
stock market returns in setting alimony requires parties to place assets at risk and does 
not provide an adequately stable source of funds for either payors or recipients of ali-
mony. 
After a 28 year marriage in which the parties built a substantial marital estate for 
themselves and a lucrative career for Husband, Wife was left at age 51 with no realistic 
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earning ability, no alimony, and only 15 percent of the parties' combined assets, which 
she was required to expend for her support. Husband's future was unaffected by this di-
vision, but Wife's standard of living was drastically altered. The legal reasoning leading 
to that inequitable result was not consistent with the standards that have been set by this 
Court, and failed to give proper weight to the burden of proof on the issues of property 
division and alimony. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT'S PROPERTY DIVISION WAS BASED ON 
AN ERRONEOUS LEGAL STANDARD, FAILED TO CLASSIFY 
ASSETS CORRECTLY, AND WAS INEQUITABLE. 
When the lower court initially awarded more than half of the marital estate to 
Wife, it justified the decision in part on the fact that significant marital assets had been 
commingled with the ranch and could no longer be separately identified. It thus found 
sufficient exceptional circumstances to justify, and even require, a variance from the 
usual one-half division of the identifiable marital estate. This Court reversed and in-
structed the lower court to explain its property division more clearly in terms of case law. 
On appeal, this Court did not decide that the trial court's belief was wrong. It 
simply asked the court to explain its reasoning process in terms of applicable legal prece-
dent. The lower court's decision on remand errs in two interlocking ways with respect to 
property division. First, the lower court erred in failing to divide the assets that had been 
commingled with the ranch; and second, it erred in failing to apply the correct legal stan-
dard in considering Wife's argument that exceptional circumstances had been shown. 
Instead, the trial court reiterated its view that equity required an unequal property division 
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but decided that, as it defined the term, "exceptional circumstances" did not exist. These 
inconsistent positions of the trial court are unexplained in the record and are contrary to 
applicable law6 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Accurately Construct and 
Account for the Marital Estate. 
The inclusion of marital property in the separate estate was an express basis for the 
trial court's initial decision to award more than 50 percent of the marital estate (excluding 
those commingled assets) to Wife. The lower court's inability to separate the commin-
gled assets from Husband's separate property was an exceptional circumstance that 
should have been accounted for by an additional award of marital property to Wife. At 
the time of the initial property division, the trial court expressly relied on the overall eq-
uity of the property division to compensate Wife for those commingled assets. (E.g., 
R.201.) 
When this Court reversed the property division, it rejected the trial court's reason-
ing process and thus rejected the trial court's effort to arrive at an "equitable" result by 
rough accounting. The full identification and division of marital property were thus 
clearly before the trial court on remand. This Court's remand following the first appeal 
instructed the trial court to "consider [the division of the marital estate] under the proper 
legal standards and procedures." 2000 UT App 213 at p. 4. That reversal required the 
trial court to more carefully account for the commingled marital property. 
The trial court's subsequent failure to accurately construct the marital and separate 
estates resulted in an award of more than 50 percent of the marital estate to Husband. 
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Under the rule o f Burt v Burt, 799 P 2iI 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), that failure to ac -
count cannot 
Husband'"1 Ik • • • •»• • * ' M i I H « " m i i \ d ^ («*- m i rqmi ^ llii1' "< 'ouil n«" " < "i" " i" 
actions that were conslrm It d for max imum tax benefits as shams. Thus , $30 ,000 in spe-
cific gifts to Wile h o m lici Ihen-lathei-in-law, which H u s b a n d ' describes as "facil i tating 
" i IA" Ik1'' drposMiMM Ins usLik1" (BncI , p l,«,|, and which 
were converted into equity in the ranch properties, simply vanishes. Similarly, Ill lliiill1. 
M
* < * the ranching operat ion to the law partnership, also used for tax benelir., Ii," \[ 
The $85,031 note to Malpaso also must be treated as marital ; - ~r 
only evidence that his interest in Malpaso was nH marital property is the bare state- , _ 
lusband admits mat -here 
«, i*~ evidence in the record concerning the crcat 
w a s "cancelled" and thus m a y be excluded from the marital estate (Brief, p . 8). Those 
ji'goiiK ills ({jiKiihir Husband ' h iml in io overcome the presumpt ion that proper ty (Mai 
volved in the company does not overcome the presumption Moreover , the "cancel la-
a transfer of value from the marital estate t :: the separate estate 
Similarly, the Moynie r proper ty was acquired and maintained in part by marital 
iunds, as clcsc mi ill \\\ IIIIII Wile s opening brief (pp 28-29). Husband cannot aecnuni for 
$14K Still in in II11, mie-fomlh nil IIIn |IIIM liase p n u k u i i d m j j j > , Ihe trial couil slmuki 
^ 
have applied the presumption that property acquired during the marriage should be in-
cluded in the marital estate. See Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317-18 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). That conclusion is even more compelling given the blatant subsidy of the ranch 
with the Moynier property by annual rental charges of only 1.80 per year. 
Husband's argument that the $65,000 of Zion's Bank stock that went into the 
ranch came from separate property is wrong. The evidence offered by Husband clearly 
showed that he sold the admittedly marital stock to fund the investment in the ranch, 
while preserving his separate shares. Exhibit D-20 is the key document. It shows shares 
held under three account numbers at Zions Bank. 
The first account number, 3000024913 (see Figure 1), is the original stock Hus-
CERT NUMBER 
• 0 012453 
0 007964 
L1 CC741Z 
U 007005 
U 0D7012 
U 004850 
a 004C04 
ar/wtiw urun 
rvotJVTfh'PV TuwwMiiiPTrtii 
SHARE/BOND AMOUNT 
2,431 
1,621 
162 
102 
• 102 
260 
2,616 
DATE ISSUED 
07/01/1981 
G9/0R/1978 
08/30/1978 
12/16/1977 
12/16/1977 
12/31/1973 
08/31/1973 
DATE SURRENDERED 
06/13/1985 
06/13/19B5 
06/13/1985 
06/13/1985 
06/13/1985 
06/13/19B5 
06/13/1985 
STOP 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
Figure 1 - Account No. 3000024913 
band received from his father. That document shows a total of 7,294 shares in 7 certifi-
cates surrendered on June 13,1985, the date the shares were placed in joint tenancy. 
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The next account number, 3000025158 (see Figure 2), shows that (hose shares, 
plus an additional 7:50 shares from,, an unknown source for a total of 8,042 shares, were 
CERT NUMBER 
ZB 032069 
ZB 014099 
ZB 001875 
ZB 001S53 
U 017370 
O 029148 
U 012454 
U 00796S 
O 020172 
U 005365 
SHARK/BOND AMOUNT DATE ISSUED DATE SURRENDERED 
$5,190 
9,365 
250 
500 
8,042 
62 
420 
2B0 
81 
480 
05/14/1997 
01/26/1993 
01/27/1988 
01/21/1988 
06/13/1985 
08/04/1982 
07/01/1981 
09/08/1978 
12/14/1977 
01/09/1975 
08/06/1992 
06/18/1991 
STO* 
oo 
00 1 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
Figure 2 - Account No. 300025158 
coii-citcu uiif certificate number TT0]'7','7ft on Tune P . 198* the dale of surrender shown 
this account are his separate property. He calculated that figure by multiplying the origi-
nal 7,294 shares by 8 to adjust for the 1/26/1993 (2 for 1) and 5/14/1997 (4 for 1) stock 
spills (kUuhil h JO, p. ().' 
1
 7,294 X 2 = 14,588. 14,588 X 4 = 58,352. 
The $65,000 could not have come from that account because all 58,352 separate 
shares mathematically connect to the original 7,294 shares. Rather, the money came 
CERT NUMBER 
ZB 032070 
ZS 02S22? 
ZB 014100 
29 Q08236 
! D 012457 
U 010051 
U 009527 
SHARE/BOND AMOUNT DATE ISSUED DATE SURRENDERED 
8,439 
976 
1,337 
300 
512 
440 
585 
05/14/1997 
02/09/1995 
01/26/1993 
08/22/1991 
07/01/1981 
02/14/1980 
05/14/1979 
02/09/1995 
STOP 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
Figure 3 - Account No. 3000025926 
from a third account, which Husband admits is marital property. That account is account 
number 3000025926 (see Figure 3). The sale of the 861 shares ($65,019) is evidenced in 
this account by the surrender of certificate number ZB014100 (1837 shares) for certifi-
cate number ZB025227 (976 shares) on February 9, 1996. This evidence conclusively 
establishes the marital account as the source of the $65,000 investment in TN Company. 
Rather than justifying the exclusion of those assets from the marital estate, Hus-
band's arguments demonstrate the extent to which marital and separate property were 
commingled in the ranching operation. The lower court should have carefully considered 
the commingling of marital property and either restored the value of the property to the 
marital estate or, more appropriately, included the entire commingled assets in the marital 
estate. The one thing the lower court was not permitted to do was give the marital assets 
to Husband without charging them to his share of the marital estate, yet that is precisely 
what the trial court ultimately did. 
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The resulting property division is not just manifestly inequitable; it actually in-
cludes admittedly and undisputedly marital property in the separate estate and thus di-
vides only a diminished marital estate. It is thus an abuse of discretion and should be re-
versed. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Correctly Define Excep-
tional Circumstances and to Explain Its Application of the 
Principle. 
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987), describes the factors the trial court 
should have considered in fashioning an equitable property division in this case. 
In fashioning an equitable property division, trial courts need consider all of the 
pertinent circumstances. The factors generally to be considered are the amount 
and kind of property to be divided; whether the property was acquired before or 
during the marriage; the source of the property; the health of the parties; the par-
ties' standard of living, respective financial conditions, needs, and earning capac-
ity; the duration of the marriage; the children of the marriage; the parties' ages at 
time of marriage and of divorce; what the parties gave up by the marriage; and the 
necessary relationship the property division has with the amount of alimony and 
child support to be awarded. 
733 P.2d at 135 (footnotes omitted). 
The trial court abdicated its responsibility to consider those factors, which are dis-
cussed at pages 23-26 of Wife's opening brief. 
THE COURT: I would say that this case still frustrates me greatly because 
when the Court of Appeals ruled as it did, it seems to me that it's just making the 
whole thing a very mathematical calculation [T]he terminology that they've 
used for me to find an exception is exceptional circumstances and exceptional cir-
cumstances, exceptional, I pulled out a dictionary to look at it, means uncommon 
[T]his is a frustration to me. I'm very troubled with [this] case, I can tell 
you." (Supp.R. 50-51.) 
THE COURT: To me that's a sad circumstance. Let me say it this way, in 
Mr. Christensen's memorandum and the citation and references to the other cases 
that have relied on the sound discretion of the trial court for that kind of history, 
that's all gone with Burke [sic - Burt] because there would be, I mean it's just a 
functionary kind of approach. You don't need a judge anymore, all you need is an 
accountant. All you need is somebody who can add up the dollars here and there 
and then just cut them right in half and give half to each and that's where I find a 
little bit of grief in my own mind because I think you know how I wrestled with 
this case in terms of trying to create a credible net worth and circumstance for Ms. 
Jensen that I felt was justified under the course of marriage and the term and dura-
tion and so on. (Supp. R. 24-25.) 
The lower court's treatment of commingled marital property, and the other evi-
dence of the parties' circumstances, required that the lower court analyze the question of 
exceptional circumstances. That was the mandate of this Court following the first appeal. 
The court did not do so, and its resulting property division is an abuse of discretion. 
Husband cites Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, 45 P.3d 176. In that case, this 
Court upheld the trial court's treatment of separate and marital assets in a very unusual 
fact setting, in which the husband had devoted exclusive time to development of separate 
property during a portion of the marriage. The case does not hold that all cases must par-
allel the Elman facts in order to justify a departure from the 50/50 rule of property divi-
sion. This case is more like Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994), in which the husband commingled marital and separate funds and thus changed 
the character of the separate property to marital. 
However, it is worth noting that in this case, by Husband's own admission, he 
"typically tried to spend one day a week in the farming-ranching side." (Brief, p. 6, cit-
ing R. 324:193-94.) The ranch did not pay him for that work. Over the 28 year marriage, 
that one day per week results in a cumulative total of four years spent augmenting the 
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value of the ranch at the expense of the marriage. This does not include the established 
commingling of marital assets with the ranch properties. 
In the trial court and in the first appeal to this Court, Wife argued that husband's 
"sweat equity" in the ranching properties was a factor that should have been considered 
in the property division. Husband enhanced his equity in the ranch and did not draw a 
salary to reimburse the marital estate for the value of his services. Although the "sweat 
equity" argument was fully briefed, this Court in its prior memorandum opinion did not 
address it, presumably because the entire property division was being reversed and the 
trial court was expected to more carefully separate marital and separate property and to 
explain in more detail how it constructed and divided the marital estate. 
This substantial "sweat equity" at the expense of the marriage was one of the ex-
ceptional circumstances justifying an unequal division of the marital estate. There is no 
logical reason to treat a wife's homemaking efforts differently when they enable a hus-
band to augment the marital estate than when they enable the husband to augment his 
separate estate. A husband's augmentation of separate property, which is at the expense 
of time he could devote to the marriage, is made possible in the same way by the same 
homemaking efforts of the wife. Elman implicitly recognizes this. The trial court erred 
in failing to consider Wife's non-financial support of Husband's augmentation of sepa-
rate property as an exceptional circumstance calling for deviation from the 50/50 property 
division requirement. 
IL THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE AWARD OF 
ALIMONY 
Husband's defense of the trial court's 180 degree reversal on the alimony issue 
depends entirely upon acceptance of that court's determination that Wife could earn 7.5 
percent on the "working" assets she was awarded. 
Husband does not attempt to show evidence in the record supporting the 7.5 per-
cent income assumption. Instead, he claims that the use of 7.5 percent was not objected 
to and therefore the issue was waived. That contention is very mistaken. Wife objected 
to the use of that figure on numerous occasions, but ultimately was forced to incorporate 
it in her own presentations to the court because the court refused to consider any other 
figure. 
At the March 26, 1999 hearing on objections to the decree of divorce before the 
first appeal, the following exchange took place: 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: And one—the one final point that I think bears on 
what has bee argued with respect to alimony, your Honor. We've used in the 
memorandum decision and in—and in the findings an assumed rate on assets that 
can be invested and seven-and-a-half percent. And a lot of the mathematics would 
change with respect to the arguments that are made if a—if a rate that is more con-
sistent with current rates, 30-year bonds are a little over five; two-year bonds are 
under five; money markets are around four; seven-and-a-half is—is—you—your 
Honor was, of course, correct on that, that historically that is true, but— 
THE COURT: Presently it isn't— 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: —history is cyclical. (R. 327 at p. 46.) 
Similarly, at the hearing following remand, Wife again complained to the court 
that the use of the 7.5 percent figure was inappropriate: 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: . . . I think the reason that the argument was made 
that there was no unmet need, was largely the result of the way the Court in its ta-
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ble, in dividing the property indicated what property was income producing and 
then suggested a rate of income on those assets based upon historical stock market 
data of seven and a half percent over time. 
THE COURT: They didn't seem to like that too much. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: No, and I honestly didn't like that too much myself 
for these reasons, Your Honor, you can't pay rent on averages and— 
THE COURT: That's right. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: —and in order to convert those assets that could be 
income producing to income producing assets, you have the capital gains factor 
that reduced what you've got and I rather felt that the appropriate way to look at 
the earnings on her income— 
THE COURT: Her assets? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: —were the actual earnings, like she was awarded 
half of the (inaudible) [sic - Zions] bank— 
THE COURT: The dividends on the stock. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: —and the dividend on that bank stock was very 
low. Actually I put forth in the brief what I believe the evidence was on that. So 
her need was pretty clear. Her ability to meet that need was due almost entirely on 
[sic] what she might get on the assets and on that analysis, the $4,000 that the 
Court ordered was amply justified from an arithmetic standpoint but when you 
factored in the larger income due to the 7.5 percent on all assets at there [sic] be-
fore tax liquidated value, it threw that out of wack [sic]. Supp. R. 10-11.) 
There are numerous other instances in the record where Wife objected to the use 
of the 7.5 percent figure. (R. 636 at p. 9-12; R. 162-65; R. 534.)2 
The use of historical average returns on investment in divorce cases is common in 
the lower courts. It should not be countenanced, especially when, as here, no witness has 
2 
The lower court chose to conduct several conferences regarding its proposed decision in 
an off-the-record setting. Although the issue is adequately preserved on the record for 
appeal and Wife does not rely on the objections made off the record, this Court should 
note that additional objection was made to the 7.5 percent figure in those conferences. 
opined that such returns can be reliably and safely achieved. Recipients of alimony can-
not pay bills with average returns, any more than payors of alimony should be charged 
with average returns in considering their ability to pay. 
In an analogous case, United States Air Tour Ass 'n v. Federal Aviation Admini-
stration, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 16535 (D.C. Cir. August 16, 2002), the court rejected 
the use of averages for similar reasons. The FAA, in determining the amount of aircraft 
noise acceptable in the Grand Canyon, relied on an average obtained by dividing the total 
noise over a year by the number of days in the year. This procedure failed to take into 
account the seasonal variation in the noise, meaning that a summer visitor to the park 
would experience unacceptable noise even though the annual average was within the ac-
ceptable range. The court reasoned: 
[T]he use of an annual average does not correspond to the experience of the Park's 
actual visitors. People do not visit the Park on "average" days, nor to they stay 
long enough to benefit from averaging noise over an entire year. For the typical 
visitor, who visits the Grand Canyon for just a few days during the peak summer 
season, the fact that the Park is quiet "on average" is cold comfort. 
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 16535 at *51-52. 
In this case, the fact that the stock market may have generated "average" returns of 
7.5 percent is cold comfort indeed in a time of back-to-back negative market returns, high 
risks, and interest rates at historic lows. In equalizing lifestyles of divorcing parties and 
setting alimony awards upon which alimony recipients must depend for their subsistence, 
trial courts should be required to rely on actual evidence of returns, not speculative aver-
ages. 
-14. 
The use of 7.5 percent infected another portion of the lower court's decision. The 
lower court clearly erred in charging Wife 7.5 percent interest on the adjustment of prop-
erty it ordered. The only income producing asset she really had, the Zion's Bank stock, 
had earned only 2.2 percent during the time in question, not the hypothetical 7.5 percent 
assumed by the lower court. 
The lower court's assumption that Wife should be charged with minimum wage 
income was also an abuse of its discretion. While almost anyone can be assumed capable 
of earning minimum wage, the issue is whether the taking of minimum wage employment 
is consistent with the lifestyle of the parties and the undisputed ability of Husband to pay 
alimony. Because of their success over the course of a 28 year marriage, these parties 
lived an affluent lifestyle that enabled Wife, now that her children are grown, to volunteer 
her time and engage in other activities. It was as abuse of discretion to expect Wife to 
exchange that lifestyle for minimum wage employment when Husband had the ability to 
pay a sufficient amount of alimony to maintain the pre-divorce lifestyle. 
Finally, the lower court failed to identify the portions of Wife's evidence of need 
that it was rejecting. Instead, it backed into a need figure of $4,000 per month without 
explaining the calculation. The lower court's failure to explain how it reduced Wife's 
proffered need of $9,852 to $4,000 was an abuse of discretion. 
Husband argues that there is no evidence in the record as to the actual dividend paid on 
the Zion's stock. Although that figure was undisputed and can easily be determined from 
the parties' tax returns or by glancing in the newspaper, any failure of proof on that issue 
works against Husband's argument. If there is no evidence as to the actual income gen-
erated by the stock, then the state of the record is that the stock produces no income, not 
that the stock produces 7.5 percent. 
For the foregoing reasons, the lower court's decision on the issue of alimony is 
flawed. The lower court's alimony determination was contrary to that court's own opin-
ion as to what was equitable. The lower court did not properly approach the question of 
alimony, and its decision should be reversed. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING WIFE TO RETURN 
$125,000 IN ALIMONY PREVIOUSLY PAID. 
Husband agrees that there was an agreement in place pursuant to which Husband 
agreed to pay wife $6,000 per month until the conclusion of the case, but claims that 
Wife should have obtained an order of temporary alimony anyway. The suggestion that 
parties should burden courts with issues that are not in dispute is not reasonable. These 
parties plainly had the issue of temporary alimony resolved. 
Husband's references to the effects of reversal in the case law ignore the fact that 
in this case the reversal was not conclusive of the issue reversed as it was in the cited 
cases. In this case, the reversal left the question of alimony precisely as it had been be-
fore trial. Husband cites no case presenting that fact scenario. Because the situation re-
garding the temporary payments was unchanged, the lower court exceeded its discretion 
in deciding that Husband's obligation, whether contractual or otherwise, had been extin-
guished. 
Temporary alimony payments are not refundable because they are based on the re-
cipient's needs during the pendency of the case. The recipient relies on those payments 
Husband argues that this amount was sufficient to meet Wife's temporary need and thus 
must also be sufficient for her permanent needs, but in doing so ignores the effects of in-
come tax, which Wife was not required to pay on the funds transferred pursuant to the 
agreement. 
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to meet those needs, and budgets accordingly. The recipient cannot know in advance 
what the court may ultimately find to be reasonable need, and thus is not expected to 
spend those funds as though the final order has been entered. In this case, if a temporary 
alimony order had been in place, it would have covered the situation caused by the rever-
sal of the alimony award. Husband's payments, which were obviously in lieu of tempo-
rary alimony, should be subject to the same rule. The requirement that $125,000 be re-
funded worked a profound inequity on Wife, who had expended that money for the sup-
port of herself and the parties' child. 
IV. HUSBAND'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING MARSHALING OF 
THE EVIDENCE ARE WITHOUT MERIT. 
Husband's brief begins with an argument that Wife has failed to marshal the evi-
dence. The marshaling requirement applies only in the limited instance where the appel-
lant is challenging the sufficiency of evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact. 
In this case, marital property awarded to Husband as separate was initially offset 
by an award of more than one-half of the marital estate to Wife. On remand, the lower 
court equalized the division of the marital estate without correcting the award of marital 
property to Husband as separate property. 
With one notable exception Wife challenges the process by which the trial court 
reached its property division and alimony decisions on remand and the fundamental ineq-
uity of those decisions. The process and the resulting decisions are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion, not for sufficiency of the evidence. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). The lower court was rigidly mathematical, candidly admitting that it was 
ignoring all principles of equity and its own prior conclusions regarding the characteriza-
tion of the parties' property as marital or separate. It failed to explain the process used in 
reaching those conclusions any more than it had the first time around, thus repeating the 
same error that had resulted in the first reversal in this case. 
The notable exception is the attribution of 7.5 percent investment income to Wife, 
which even Husband concedes was without any evidentiary support. 
The marshaling requirement is all too often raised by appellees as a mask for seri-
ous weaknesses in their cases. Such is the case here. This Court should reject Husband's 
assertion and rectify the fundamental inequity that resulted from the trial court's flawed 
legal analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
Wife requests that this court reverse the trial court's Second Supplemental Decree 
of Divorce and, utilizing the initial evidence before the court, combined with the addi-
tional findings made by the court following remand, reinstate the property division and 
alimony awards contained in the initial decree. Alternatively, Wife requests that this 
court remand the case to the lower court for application of the correct legal standards in 
determining property division and alimony. 
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